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Intentional over-treatment: The unmentionable
conflict-of-interest
James W. Jones, MD, PhD, MHA, and Laurence B. McCullough, PhD, Houston, TexIt is asking more than human perfection to assume that a
surgeon’s judgment may not be influenced unconsciously by
a pressing financial need.
Edwin P. Lehman, MD (Surgery 28:595, 1950)
Dr I.R. Tepid, highly regarded in residency, joined
the group practice 9 months ago. His practice lacks the
volume anticipated by the practice partners. He has not
covered his expenses thus far and has 15 months re-
maining to receive a lucrative contractual salary, bene-
fits, office help, and a nurse assistant. Everyone except
Dr Tepid gets their salary from professional fees after
expenses. The three other senior vascular surgeons are
overloaded with work while the new associate goes to
meetings and studies for his boards. Dr C. Ponzi, a
founding partner who championed the hiring, wants
Tepid released. What should be done?
A. Give him time to get known in the area.
B. Start encouraging him in a jocular manner to operate
more.
C. Hire a leg-biter attorney to connect his salary and
trip-taking to productivity.
D. Send more of the group’s patients needing vascular
consults to him.
E. Separate him from the group.
No other secular profession exceeds medicine in having
so many potential conflicts of interest and in which the
stakes of remaining clearly focused on the interests of those
served and not self-interest are so high, except perhaps
military officers in combat situations. The medical profes-
sion is as close as secular gets to sacred, but as with all whom
society idealizes, medicine is at risk of rapidly becoming
profane if exploited. Professionalism is medicine’s morality
codified. Medical professionalism has standards set by val-
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Professional conflicts of interest (COI) are temptations
that blur objectivity crucial to evidence-basedmedical prac-
tice. COI can involve nonmonetary interests such as con-
venient hours, time for activities other than medical prac-
tice, and one’s religion or beliefs, but most often, and most
identifiable, are conflicts involving money in some form or
another. Professional COI threaten the fiduciary obligation
of the physician to protect and promote the patient’s
health-related interests by practicing medicine in an unbi-
ased fashion and keeping one’s own self-interest systemat-
ically secondary.1 The present case emphasizes a conflict at
the palpable marrow of medical practice. Arising astride
waning clinical volume, particularly when beginning anew,
personal financial pressures may directly influence recom-
mendations of care. Over-treatment is rarely overt; it slips
in beneath watered-down indications.
What wisdom do our guiding professional docu-
ments offer? The Hippocratic Oath emphasizes benefi-
cence (doing good) and nonmaleficence (avoiding inten-
tional harm) indicating the “correctness” of therapy as,
“I will apply dietetic measures for the benefit of the sick
according to my ability and judgment; I will keep them
from harm and injustice.” Not prohibiting over-treatment,
those Oath takers in ancient Greece did not possess the
expensive therapies available today. The Declaration of
Geneva is more general implying that COI must be respon-
siblymanaged: “. . .the health ofmy patient shall bemy first
[but not only] consideration.” Another popular reworked
version of the Oath by Louis Lasagna pins down the
message as, “I will apply, for the benefit of the sick, all
measures [that] are required, avoiding those twin traps of
over-treatment and therapeutic nihilism.”
Intentional over-treatment is such an obvious ethics
breach that it is the medical equivalent of a four-letter-word.
Over-treatment is considered extensively by politicians,
insurance executives, and economists, rarely by physicians.
Over-treatment occurs when the patient is subjected to
diagnostic or therapeutic interventions that, in evidence-
based clinical judgment, should not be expected to benefit
the patient clinically. They result in net iatrogenic harm.We
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drels every time our cars require repair, and some are, but
even the worst only cheat us of money. Medical over-
treatment can cost and then injure, maim, or even kill; it is
fraudulent antiprofessionalism.
In a follow-up to “Code of Professional Conduct,” the
American College of Surgeons Task Force on Professional-
ism suggested that considerations of the effect of expense
on communities be considered2 by stating, “We, as sur-
geons, frequently perform expensive therapy. The interests
of our individual patient may conflict with the resources
available to other patients and to the community at large.
We, as advocates for our patients, must remain sensitive to
the limited resources available in our hospitals and our
communities.” This is an important consideration but only
arrives at the stoop of over-treatment.
The Charter on Medical Professionalism recognizes
that medical treatment can be overdone and forcefully
urges that it be avoided. “The physician’s professional
responsibility for appropriate allocation of resources re-
quires scrupulous avoidance of superfluous tests and pro-
cedures. The provision of unnecessary services not only
exposes one’s patients to avoidable harm and expense but
also diminishes the resources available for others.”3
End-of-life provides a fertile area to examine over-
treatment: patients are desperate.4 When questioned about
what they witnessed, medical students perceived, “that the
medical system is over-treating patients and sometimes
causing harm to dying patients.”5 Earle examined Medicare
claims of 28,777 patients 65 years and older dying of cancer
and found 15.7% received chemotherapy within the last 2
weeks of their life.6 In a study typical of current literature on
patients who had advanced pancreatic cancer, after 45
cycles of chemotherapy, the median survival was a paltry
6.8 months.7 The authors’ Panglossian conclusions were,
“Treatment with NFL chemotherapy is well-tolerated in
patients with advanced pancreatic cancer . . . survival in
these patients with poor prognosis compares favorably with
other treatment options.” There are aggressive oncologists
who administer therapy costing 100% more than those less
aggressive, and despite the increased cost and morbidity,
survival is the same.8
In a more general sense, economists developed and
studied the target-income model of Physician-Induced-
Demand early inMedicare’s fee regulation era. As fees were
decreased by Medicare managers, physicians did in fact
compensate by increasing their services to Medicare pa-
tients, enough to replace from 40%9 to 70%10 of lost
income. Medical care consumption in the more lucrative
private insurance sector was also increased during this
period, perhaps to an even greater degree, as doctors scram-
bled to catch up.9 When physicians weren’t making addi-
tional interventions to compensate for the lowered profit-
ability of some Medicare-targeted procedures, they made
up the difference by applying their time to something else.
A 10% decrease in Medicare’s physician payments for cata-
ract removal caused a 5% increase in the incidence of
noncataract procedures.11 In a community that fluoridatedits water, dentists compensated for the reduction in correc-
tive dental services by increasing their restorative work.12
This is disturbing evidence of irresponsibly managed eco-
nomic COI.
Few data are available concerning surgical procedures,
and nonsurgical data imply rather than impeach. And it
generally appears that increases in procedural utilization are
in the gray areas rather than being unindicated. When
increased utilization of angiography was examined accord-
ing to guidelines proposed by the College of Cardiology,
the increase was in the group that angiography was useful
and effective, not in the unindicated group.13
Our scenario is oft repeated as practices grow and new
associates are recruited. We have all heard of newly added
surgeons “not working out” after a short time. “Not work-
ing out” has multiple causality: personality clashes, moral
issues, newly minted surgeons passing through professional
adolescence, and the new surgeon becoming too success-
ful, to name a few. However, most spats in surgical group
practices involve money. Most surgical groups do a good
job with their new additions, but other groups have great
difficulty finding someone “good enough.”
This case contains the pressure of personal financial
need and moral trespass of the senior surgeons who are
behaving at best insensitively and at worst unethically. If
the new surgeon has sufficient foundational knowledge and
any moral worth, he is operating on referrals that have
proper indications for surgery and following those patients
who do not. Nudging Dr Tepid to do more operations,
without providing him more referrals, pressures him to
lower his threshold for recommending surgery and puts his
patients at systematic risk of malignant over-treatment. If
Dr Tepid is lazy or lacks standards of talent desired by the
group, correct those deficiencies or let him go, but do not
ask him to marginalize his fiduciary duty. Option B at-
tempts to cover a serious moral breach. It overtly pressures
while deceptively seeming not to do so, and it obviates
dialogue about how to correct a serious group practice rift.
Afterwards, neither side will have learned how to avoid
repetition of one of the most unpleasant series of events in
group practice.
Terminating a contract or changing the terms when the
contract lacks stipulations about productivity levels, as
mentioned in answers C and E, are inappropriate moral and
legal responses because they would violate the fledgling
surgeon’s rights. Groups seeking to recruit new members
should study their practice dynamic and be prepared to
commit to helping new members to become successful.
Taking on new members only to lessen on-call pressures or
other reasons unrelated to patient care quality violates
fiduciary responsibilities.
In all except the largest medical staffs, a new surgeon
should be known by a normal gestation period, especially in
a high-profile specialty. The other partners in the group
have not properly introduced him to the community. Wait-
ing an additional time without helping him get known will
only make things worse. Option A does not explicitly
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A group practice should be just that: members of like
abilities and mindsets who share equally in the workloads
and ultimately in the rewards of the practice. Newmembers
of a group practice should share in a referral system they did
not create with every expectation that they will create
opportunities for a next generation. Option D implements
these ethical considerations and should be adopted in this
case.
This dictum provides continuum eloquently stated by a
beloved teacher, Dr Charles Dunlop of Tulane, at gradua-
tion, “The affection and respect you will command from
this day forward as doctors of medicine—these are not
things of your own making. These things have been earned
for you by the decency and humanity of countless genera-
tions of good men of all faiths over the past three thousand
years. These men are dead and for the next few years you
will hold in your own hands this magnificent heritage.” We
believe he was talking about honest medical fiduciaries that
would not intentionally under-treat or over-treat nor en-
courage others to do so.
This case scenario was suggested by a similar one from
Charles G. Wells, a medical student at the University of
Alabama.
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